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Comments and Casenotes
Conclusiveness Of Blood Tests In Paternity Suits
State v. Pernell'
Defendant was charged in a bastardy proceeding with
being the father of twins. The prosecuting witness testified
to acts of sexual intercourse with the defendant (admitted
by him) which in the natural course of events could have
caused the pregnancy and the birth of children. Blood
test results showed that it was impossible for the defendant
to have been the father of one of the twins, Donald, but
that the paternity of the other twin, Daniel, could not be
excluded.2 Thus, the two children in the instant case posed
separate legal problems. Since there was no question that
the blood-type of Donald excluded the defendant as father,
the only question in regard to him was the weight to be
given to the tests. Referring to dicta in Shanks v. State,3
the Court held that, in the absence of evidence that the
1 Crim. Ct. of Balto. City, No. B.I. 872, 1956, as analyzed in Myerberg,
The Practical Aspects of Divorce Practice (2d ed. 1961) 108. See, Bowen,
Blood Tests and Disputed Parentage, 18 Md. L. Rev. 111 (1958) which this
casenote supplements.
2 The blood tests showed that the mother was of blood group 0, while
the blood group of the defendant was B. Donald's group was A, and
Daniel's B. These results, confirmed by later tests, make it an apparent
biological impossibility for the defendant to have been the father of the
twin having blood group A, viz., Donald.
The use of blood samples as evidence in paternity cases stems from
discoveries, beginning with the work of Landsteiner in 1900, that human
blood contains certain characteristics which follow the Mendelian laws of
inheritance. These characteristics are the tendencies of the individual's
red corpuscles to gather together ("agglutinate") when in contact with
certain substances known as agglutinens. Thus, if a person's blood is of
group A, it will react by clotting only when tested with one agglutinen,
while if it is of group B, such agglutination will occur only when a certain
different agglutinen is used. If the blood clots in response to either of the
testing fluids, it is described as "AR"; if it reacts to neither, it is
called "0".
At least two other principle classifications of human blood, the MN types
and Rh factors, and subsequently a number of less familiar classifications,
have been discovered. For a lucid explanation of the mechanics of ABO
groupings and MN series, see McOoRMIcx, EVIDENCE (1954) §§ 177, 178 and
1 WIGMOaE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 165a, b, which contains a thorough
discussion of the uses of ABO tests.
3 185 Md. 437, 449, 45 A. 2d 85 (1945). In this case the Court of Appeals,
referring to bastardy cases, stated: "[T]he court and the legislature are
there dealing with a situation where self-incrimination is involved, and
where the non-scientific evidence is often quite unreliable and scientific
evidence may be conclusive as to non-paternity."
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tests were improperly conducted, conclusive weight should
be given to them, and defendant was exonerated of
Donald's paternity.
In regard to Daniel, the Court was faced with the rele-
vant Maryland statute governing admissibility of blood
tests in paternity cases, which permits such evidence to be
employed only where there is exclusion.4 The Court was
forced to decide whether the exclusion which was found in
Donald's case should extend to Daniel also. After hearing
expert testimony as to the likelihood that twins might
each have a different father, the Court concluded that this
possibility is not sufficiently supported by medical au-
thority to be the basis for a decision.5 In view of this con-
clusion and of the defendant's testimony indicating an
admission on the part of the mother that he was not the
father of the twins, the Court delivered a verdict of not
guilty. Since, in rejecting the hypothesis that the twins
had different fathers, the Court in effect decided that the
tests excluded defendant as regards both children, it is
interesting that the opinion does not insist that conclusive
weight be given the test in Daniel's case. This reluctance
may reflect some uncertainty as to the exclusion of Daniel,
especially in view of the relative rarity of the blood group
within which the father fell6 and the respectable amount
of data in favor of the possibility that the twins had dif-
ferent fathers.
The Maryland statute governing blood tests for pa-
ternity enacted in 19411 applies only to bastardy pro-
ceedings.8 It does not require the complainant to submit
' 1 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 12, § 20.
5 The opinion points out that the prosecuting witness may either have
had intercourse with a man in blood group AB, who fathered both children,
or have had relations with a person in group A after or before having
had intercourse with the defendant. The Court received opinions by Dr.
Sacks and by Dr. Nicholson J. Eastman, retired professor of obstetrics
at The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine and obstetrician-in-
chief at The Johns Hopkins Hospital, as to two hypotheses -under which
the twins might have had different fathers. Under one theory, known as
superfecundation, intercourse with both males must have occurred within
a matter of hours. The other theory, superfetation, much less firmly
established, would require that the two acts of intercourse have been
separated by approximately a alonth. The Court also noted that the
children were of approximately the same weight (which would have been
unnatural under the superfetation theory) and heard Dr. Eastman's
opinion that superfetation is now believed impossible.
6 AB is the rarest of the four blood groups, occurring in some 3 per cent
of the population; see Shanks v. State, supra, n. 3, and McCoRmicK, op.
cit. supra, n. 2, § 178.
'1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 12, § 20.
8 Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 449, 45 A. 2d 85 (1945). In this case the
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, which had allowed into evidence
in a rape case the results of blolod tests of defendant's coat to show the
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to the test ordered by the Court, although such refusal may
be disclosed at the trial. The application of the law is
restricted to cases where definite exclusion is established.
Since the statute does not indicate that evidence which
does exclude the defendant shall be given conclusive
weight,9 apparently the test results (or a complainant's
refusal to be tested) may be weighed by judge or jury
as one piece of evidence against other facts or possibilities
in a case.
No case has required the Court of Appeals to decide
directly whether conclusive weight must be given to the
tests, although dicta in Shanks v. State0 may have so in-
dicated. In Fiege v. Boehm," the defendant, in a suit for
breach of a contract to support the plaintiff's child (al-
legedly fathered by defendant), urged that he had been
acquitted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City on the
basis of blood tests. The Court of Appeals stated that,
in the contract case, it was immaterial whether or not the
defendant was the father of the child, and references to
blood-testing in the opinion were thus only dicta. In an-
other case, State v. Cook,'2 the State was initially success-
ful in using, as sole proof of non-access to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy, the results of blood tests of
the mother, her husband, and the child. This case did not
directly involve the conclusiveness of the tests, nor did it
reach the Court of Appeals, since the State did not
prosecute further when the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City granted the defendant's motion for a new trial.
On the issue of whether evidence from expertly per-
formed blood tests excluding a defendant should be con-
clusive, two views are found in other jurisdictions. The
view espousing conclusiveness has the unequivocal sup-
port of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity.'" The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the
Act stated that no state statute on blood-testing up to
the time of the Uniform Act had made the results conclu-
falsity of his assertions that the blood stains came from a fight with a
different girl.
01 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 12 § 20: "The result of the test shall be
received in evidence, but only in case definite exclusion is established.
(Emphasis added.)
10 Supra, n. 8.
210 Md. 352, 123 A. 2d 316 (1956).
12 Daily Record, February 21, 1957 (B.I. No. 659, 1956).
9 U.L.A. 102 (1957). As of 1961 the Uniform Act bad been adopted as
follows: in 1953 by California (C.C.P.A. §§ 1980.1-1980.7 (1960) ), New
Hampshire (R.S.A. 522: 1-522.10 (1955) ), and Oregon (ORS 109.250-262(1959) ) ; in 1957 by Illinois (S.H.A. Ch. 1063/4, §§ 1-7 (1962)) in 1961
by Pennsylvania (28 P.S. §§ 307.1-307.10 (1962)).
1962]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
sive. The Act very carefully provided for rigorous
standards of testing by making conclusiveness depend upon
agreement of the experts who made the tests in the par-
ticular case.'4 The Note stated:
"The conclusion should be final if there is no dispute
among the experts .... [A]nd true experts will not
disagree. Every test will show the same results. * * *
The character of the chromosomes of the blood is
constant and consequently other experts will always
arrive at the same results in further tests in classi-
fying blood in a certain group. Should there be such
a thing as disagreement among the experts, which will
not be the case, then, of course, the finality would be
a different matter, and provision should be made for
submission to the triers of fact.' 15
Clearly, the only concern of the Commissioners is that the
tests be expertly and honestly conducted; the validity then
of the results is for them unquestionable. Their suggested
consensus of experts is an adroit way of circumventing any
trier of fact who, by alleging distrust of the competence
of the performance of the tests, bases a decision solely on
sympathy for a plaintiff.
A series of California decisions demonstrates the effect
of adoption of the Uniform Act in one state. In 1937, prior
to the adoption of the Act, the Supreme Court of California
refused, in Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 6 to hold the results of
blood tests conclusive. Subsequently, in the widely-
publicized case of Berry v. Chaplin,'17 an intermediate ap-
pellate court, noting that Arais had not been overruled or
modified felt obliged to submit the question of paternity
to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff
despite the testimony of experts that blood tests excluded
defendant. In neither the Arais nor the Chaplin opinions is
there any suggestion that the tests were not competently
performed; indeed, in Chaplin the qualifications and in-
tegrity of the designated physicians were conceded. But
the recent case of Kusior v. Silver,5 makes it plain that
14 For a discussion of the need for the highest standards of testing, see
the report to the 1937 Atlantic City convention of the American Medical
Association by Drs. Ludvig Hekloen, Karl Landsteiner and Alexander S.
Wiener, of the Associatibn's Committee on Medicolegal Problems, 108
J.A.M.A. 2138 (1937).
-9 U.L.A. 102, 103 (1957).
1010 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P. 2d- 1043 (1937).
17 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946).
Is54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P. 2d 657 (1960).
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the adoption of the Uniform Act by California 19 will make
blood-test results conclusive in future cases similar to
Arais and Chaplin.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in applying a
statute which did not give conclusive effect to the results of
blood tests, settled the matter judicially. In Jordan v.
Davis,20 while conceding that the testimony of definite
exclusion had been given by an eminently-qualified ex-
pert, the Court had refused to say that the jury had been
manifestly wrong in refusing to follow the blood-test evi-
dence. The following year, in Jordan v. Mace,21 the same
Court found that a jury had no grounds for doubting the
care and skill with which the tests had been made, and
that they therefore had had no basis for their verdict
against the defendant.
Perhaps a leading example of a jurisdiction which re-
fused to give conclusive effect to blood tests is New
Jersey. In 1940 the Court of Chancery, in Bednarik v.
Bednarik,22 held that a statute authorizing courts to order
blood tests in civil cases23 was an unconstitutional invasion
of the right of privacy. In 1950 the holding in Bednarik
was expressly overruled by the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court in Cortese v. Cortese,24 which reserved the
question of conclusiveness. In Ross v. Marx25 the same
court, citing cases on both sides in other jurisdictions, con-
cluded that expert opinions as to non-parternity based on
blood-grouping tests were not so infallible as to be con-
clusive. However, regardless of the theory stated, the
decision itself was in accord with the tests. The Court
quoted from a then very recent report by Drs. Israel
Davidsohn, Philip Levine, and Alexander S. Wiener, of
the American Medical Association's Committee on Medico-
legal Problems,6 which was published to update a similar
report issued in 1937.27 The later report concedes the
2Supra, n. 13.
- 143 Me. 185, 57 A. 2d 209 (1948).
11144 Me. 351, 69 A. 2d 670 (1949). The facts in Mace strikingly parallel
those in the present case, in that there too the defendant was excluded as
father of one twin, but not as to the other twin. Since the Jury had
found -the defendant to be the father of both, the Supreme Judicial Court
granted the new trial without deciding what view the court below should
take of the twin not excluded. For further analysis f the Davis and
Mace cases, see Bowen, op. cit. aupra, n. 1, 116-118.
218 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (1940).
-2A N.J.S.A. (1952) §§ 83-2, 83-3.
10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A. 2d 717 (1950).
"24 N . Super. 25, 93 A. 2d 597 (1952) ; petition for certification den.
14 N.J. 466, 102 A. 2d 694 (1954).
"149 J.A.M.A. 699 (June 14, 1952).
0 Supra, n. 14.
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possibility of mutations in extremely rare instances and
also appears to favor tests which are not binding on the
courts, as a safeguard against improperly-conducted tests.
The Court in Ross would appear to have found weighty
authority for its conservative position, and the recent case
of State v. H.C.,'2 reiterates that position.
In view of the tremendous discoveries which have led
to blood testing, and of the manifest value of the tests in
suits involving disputed paternity, it would be natural to
agree emotionally with the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Nearly everyone would agree that the re-
sults reached by juries in Berry v. Chaplin29 and Jordan
v. Mace8 ° were deplorable. Even the most conservative
discussions of the development of blood testing emphasize
its almost absolute accuracy, at least where exclusion is
found. While there remains the possibility that, in a given
case, mutation may occur to cause an apparent exception
to the Mendelian laws of inheritance, statistical studies
would seem to reduce this possibility to an infinitesimal
chance. There appears little likelihood that further re-
search will do anything to reverse the present evaluation of
blood testing. Nor would it seem likely that the lamenta-
ble but inevitable increase in mutations which is promised
as a result of nuclear testing will be sufficient to signifi-
cantly affect the value of blood tests in the future.
The issue, however, is whether these scientific dis-
coveries should result in an absolute presumption that,
where experts agree that a defendant is definitely excluded,
their testimony should prevail over all other types of
evidence. It is apparent that, to reach a result in accord
with scientific knowledge in Jordan v. Mace, it was not
necessary that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine be
bound by a statute such as the Uniform Act. Admittedly,
a statutory requirement of conclusiveness could have pre-
vented the miscarriage of justice at the trial level which
apparently occurred in the Davis3l and Mace cases. How-
ever, it is to be hoped that judges and even juries are
approaching a level of sophistication which may prevent
such decisions and verdicts.
The handling of the present case is a practical demon-
stration that just and realistic results can be reached with-
out a statute which would in effect substitute a panel of
experts for judge or jury. In the case of the one twin
29 61 N.J. Super. 432, 161 A. 2d 273, 274 (1960).
" Supra, n. 17.3Supra, n. 21.
Supra, n. 20.
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definitely excluded, the Court, relying on the dictum in
Shanks v. State,2 gave conclusive weight to the test re-
sults. Without that dictum, there is no reason to suppose
that the Court would have reached another result. More-
over, in the more complex issue of the second twin, the
Court disregarded the whole, quite superfluous doctrine of
"conclusiveness". As we have seen, the Court did not,
however, dispense with expert advice. Had the Court not
been content with the opinions of the experts who testi-
fied, additional authorities might have been consulted. It
is difficult to see how a sounder decision could have been
reached had a panel of experts, rather than a judge (or,
in a different case, a jury advised by a judge), in effect
arbitrated the question. Indeed, such a panel would have
been obliged, even if the Uniform Act had governed this
trial, to wait until the Court decided whether definite
exclusion in fact obtained. When, in the present case, this
had been decided, the Court was as well qualified as ex-
perts to render a properly scientific decision.
Finally, if, in a future case, there should be any doubts
as to the skill or integrity with which the tests were made,
it would be very questionable indeed whether justice could
be best served by a court bound by a requirement (statu-
tory or judge-made) that the expert testimony be given
conclusive weight. This seems to have been in the minds
of the eminent physicians of the American Medical Asso-
ciation's Committee on Medicolegal Problems when they
stated in 1952:
"While the results of the blood tests are admissible
when they exclude paternity, the findings are not
binding on the court. That is as it should be. It is the
duty of the court to examine the evidence in order to
convince itself that the tests have been properly car-
ried out by qualified experts. When the court feels
that adequate safeguards have not surrounded the
tests, it should order the tests to be repeated by an
independent expert, and there is nothing to prevent
shipping of the blood to another part of the country if
there is no other qualified expert in the state in which
the case is being tried. In divorce and separation
actions the court often takes into account other con-
siderations, aside from the scientific results of the
blood tests. To base decisions entirely on the results
of the blood tests in such cases may harm an innocent
Supra, n. 8.
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third party by bastardizing the child. For this reason
in a number of cases the court has refused to grant
a divorce on the basis of the blood tests alone. In
uncontested divorce actions, however, when the blood
tests exclude paternity, the court has no choice but to
grant the decree."33
In the absence of a new report by the Committee, the
Maryland Legislature or the courts of this State should
not try to be more "scientific" than the scientists.
JAMEs P. LEWIS
LARRY H. PoZANEK
The Cy Pres Doctrine Explored
Miller v. Mer.-Safe Dep. & Tr. Co.'
A testator bequeathed the residue of his estate to four
named charitable institutions, one of which had forfeited
its charter subsequent to the drawing of the will. The
Maryland Court of Appeals divided the funds left to the
extinct organization among the remaining three. In so
doing, the Court presented an initial interpretation of the
Maryland cy pres statute, enacted in 1945.2
Cy pres is derived from a Norman-French phrase mean-
ing "as near as." BLACK defines it as "a rule for the con-
struction of instruments in equity, by which the intention
of the party is carried out 'as near as may be,' when it
would be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect."' The
doctrine is applied where a testator, settlor, or donor has
indicated a general charitable intention which is incapable
of being carried out in the specific manner directed; and
the result of its application is the subordination or sacrifice
8Supra, n. 26, pp. 703, 704.
1224 Md. 380, 168 A. 2d 184 (1961).
12 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 196:
"If a . .. bequest for charity, ait the time it was intended to be-
come effective, is illegal, or impossible or impracticable of enforce-
ment, and if the ... testator, manifested a general intention to devote
the property to charity, a court of equity may, on application of
. any interested person, or the Attorney General of the State,
order an administration of the .. . bequest as nearly as possible to
fulfill the general charitable intention of the . . . testator."
'ELCK'S, LAw DIcTIoNARY (4th ed. 1951).
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